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Even though classic theories and models of discrete choice pose man as a rational being, it has
been shown extensively that people persistently violate rationality in their actual choices. Re-
cent models of decision-making take these violations often (partially) into account, however,
a unified framework has not been established. Here we propose such a framework, inspired
by the Ising model from statistical physics, and show that representing choice problems as a
graph, together with a simple choice process, allows us to explain both rational decisions as
well as violations of rationality.
(Ir)rational choice
Over the last century, our perception of peoples choice behaviour as being rational, consistent, and
profit-maximising, shifted to one where we now describe human decision-making as biased, uncer-
tain, and settling for a satisfactory outcome. The feature thought to determine the appeal of choice
alternatives, first changed from expected value1, 2, to expected utility3, 4, and then to the prospect
of the alternative5. Instead of mulling over a decision until it was clear what the best option was,
people where shown to stop when an acceptable alternative had been found, a consequence of what
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was termed bounded rationality6. Rather than an unwavering regularity in their choices, people be-
have rather inconsistently, for example because of the endowment effect, which entails that people
tend to value an alternative higher as soon as they have chosen it, compared to when they have
not7.
Two competing classes of decision-making models are random- and fixed utility models, the first
assuming that choice is deterministic but with the appeal of the alternatives as a random variable
that changes over time8–10, whereas the second posits that the appeal of alternatives is fixed, but the
decision process is of probabilistic nature11, 12. These models of choice often assume choices to be
rational in nature by endowing them with properties such as the independence of an alternative’s
appeal from irrelevant alternatives, and the existence of a, either weak or strong, transitivity in
the ordering of choice appeal8, 11. Although these are statistically desirable properties, it has been
shown that they are often violated. Most well known of these violations are the similarity, attraction
and compromise effect12–22.
With the increased understanding of the complexity of human decision-making, both the theories
and models describing choice behaviour have become increasingly complex as well18, 23. Although
these models take violations of rationality into account, this is either the case for one of the viola-
tions and not the other, or only for violations taking place under specific conditions. Developing a
framework that integrates these (partial) theories and explains the key choice phenomena is thus a
worthwhile effort.
In this article we propose a simple choice framework, that allows us to explain both rational and
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irrational choices. We achieve this by framing choices as a combination of cues and alternatives
and the relation between them, and introduce a simple decision process that stops when the choice
conditions are met for the first time, as such implementing bounded rationality. Using only this
decision rule, known violations of rationality, and other choice phenomena such as the endowment
effect, follow naturally from the model.
Choice Setup
Choices are framed as combinations of cues and alternatives. Cues represent the conditions of the
choice, e.g. ‘buy a book’ or ‘select a present’, and alternatives describe the possible choices. The
relations between these alternatives and cues, and between alternatives themselves, are what govern
the initial conditions of a choice. An appropriate representation of this framework is a graph, the
vertices of which correspond to alternatives and cues, and the edges describing the relationship
between the vertices. Figure 1 shows two examples of possible choice graphs.
To formalise a choice graph with n vertices as a probability distribution, we letσ = [σ1, σ2, . . . , σn]
be the state vector of the n vertices, where σi ∈ {0, 1} denotes if vertex i is active (σi = 1) or
inactive (σi = 0), and endow the states with the following distribution;
σ ∼ p(σ) =
1
Zβ
exp

β

∑
i
σi µi +
∑
〈i,j〉
σiσj ωij



 . (1)
Equation 1 can be recognised as an Ising model24, 25 originally introduced in statistical physics
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CA1 A2 A3
Figure 1: Graph for a choice with one cue (C), and three alternatives (A1, A2, A3).
Solid edges represent positive relations between vertices (ω > 0), whereas dashed edges represent negative relations
(ω < 0). Base appeal of the alternatives (µ) is represented by the ring around the vertex. Solid rings represent
appealing alternatives (µ > 0), whereas a dashed rings represent unappealing alternatives (µ < 0). The thickness of
both the edges and rings around the vertices corresponds to intensity of the relation/appeal.
to model the ferromagnetic behaviour of magnetic dipole moments of atomic spins on a lattice.
Where µi is the force of the external magnetic field interacting with spin i, ωij the pairwise inter-
action between spins i and j, and β the inverse temperature of the system. Zβ is the appropriate,
temperature dependent, normalising constant to make the probabilities sum to one, also known
as the partition function. While this application was later rejected, due to incompatibility with
quantum mechanics, in favour of the Heisenberg model, it has remained highly popular and one
of the most studied models in modern statistical physics26. Also outside the field of physics the
Ising model has attracted attention as a way to model the joint distribution of binary variables as a
function of main effects and pairwise interactions27–30.
In the current context µi can be perceived as the base appeal of cue/alternative i, whereas ωij
specifies the strength of the relation between cues and/or alternatives i and j. In Figure 1 it is
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shown how differences in µ and ω are represented in the choice graphs. In equation 1 can be
seen that the inverse temperature β scales the magnitude of both the base appeal and pairwise
interactions. While the quantity of β is known in thermodynamics as a function of the temperature
and the Boltzmann constant, in the current application it is not identifiable. It can however be
interpreted, in the context of decision-making, as a measure of choice consistency, as with lower β
choice behaviour becomes increasingly random, until β = 0, where the choice is purely random.
It is assumed that before a person is faced with a choice, the internal state of the decision maker,
the resting state, is in accordance with the Ising model from equation 1.
When a person is confronted with a choice, the appropriate cue vertex (c) gets activated (σc =
1), and remains active during the choice process. Second, to represent that a single alternative
needs to be chosen, lateral inhibition, a neural concept where an exited neuron inhibits its direct
neighbours, is introduced between the alternatives that are part of the choice31. In the framework
this is represented by lowering the interaction between each pair of alternatives with a constant
(ε), such that otherwise independent alternatives become negatively related. The consequence of
this inhibition is that a choice structure will naturally tend to move to a state in which, apart from
the cue vertex, only one alternative will remain activated32. Furthermore, the stronger the lateral
inhibition, the faster the system will tend to the state with only one alternative remaining active.
Factors such as time-pressure, importance of a choice (e.g. buying a house vs. buying a book),
and general (in)decisiveness might be possible contributors to variations in both β and ε. Imposing
the condition that, next to the cue vertex, only one additional alternative vertex can remain active
(
∑n
i=1 σi = σ+ = 2), on the resting state distribution, represent the choice condition where a
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single alternative needs to be chosen. Enforcing these conditions on the Ising model we obtain
conditional choice probabilities for each alternative.
p(σa6=c = 1 | σc = 1,
n∑
i=1
σi = σ+ = 2) =
exp (β [µa + ωca])∑
j 6=c exp (β [µj + ωcj])
. (2)
Equation 2 can be recognised as a multinomial logistic regression model, and shows that under
the imposed conditions, the pairwise interactions between alternatives, either from pre-existing
conditions or lateral inhibition, vanish, and the probability of choosing alternative a is only de-
pendent on its base appeal (µa) and relation with the cue (ωca). The conditional distribution thus
preserves both independence of irrelevant alternatives, and stochastic transitivity, that is, the model
has rational decision-making as its ground state.
Choice Process
Why irrational choice behaviour does occur is explained by the choice process that describes how a
person moves from an instance of the Ising model in equation 1, to an instance of the appropriately
conditioned Ising model as seen in equation 2. We model the choice process, one of sequential
elimination of alternatives, as a Markov process with the conditioned choice probabilities as their
unique invariant distribution. For expository purposes we consider one of the simplest examples
of such a process, a Metropolis algorithm with single-spin-flip dynamics33.
Let σ denote the current state of the choice structure, then at every step in the decision process one
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alternative is randomly selected (σs) and its value flipped (σ
∗
s = (σs − 1)
2). The resulting config-
uration is our proposal state, denoted by σ∗, which we accept with the appropriate probability.
p(σ → σ∗) = min

1, exp
(
β
[∑
i σ
∗
i µi +
∑
〈i,j〉 σ
∗
i σ
∗
j ω
ε
ij
])
exp
(
β
[∑
i σi µi +
∑
〈i,j〉 σiσj ω
ε
ij
])

 , (3)
whereΩε is the lateral inhibition adjusted pairwise interaction matrix, in which the relations among
the alternatives are lowered by a constant (ε). Using these acceptance probabilities ensures that in
the long run states are in accordance with the conditioned Ising model.
From the choice probabilities in equation 2 it is clear that if we let the Markov chain run until
convergence, the effect of lateral inhibition and any other (in)direct interactions between choice
alternatives will have worn out, and only the direct interactions between cues and alternatives
matter. As such, in this case it is guaranteed that choices are rational. However, if a person stops
when the conditions (i.e., σc = 1 and σ+ = 2) hold for the first time, the same is not true.
By introducing the rule that a person stops whenever the conditions of the choice problem are
met for the first time, the model implements the idea of bounded rationality, which states that,
as a function of limited cognitive capacity and time, people will search for an alternative that is
satisfactory, instead of the most appealing one6. The major contribution of this mechanism is that
it predict the occurrence of irrational choices, as we explain next.
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Results
For each of the three classic violations of rationality, known as the similarity-, attraction-, and
compromise-effect, we provide a simple example and illustrate how the proposed choice structure
allows us to explain the observed deviations from rational behaviour as a function of interactions
between the alternatives, and the rule that a choice will be made as soon as the choice conditions
hold for the first time. As the decision is the result of a process that has Markov properties, we
can, as we show in the methods section, for small n, analytically derive the expected response
frequencies, by establishing a stochastic matrix containing the transition probabilities p(σ → σ∗)
for all 2n possible configurations of the system.
It is important to realise that for each of the upcoming examples more than one possible way exists
in which a choice can be structured, such that we obtain expected response frequencies that align
with empirical observations. One reason for this is the interchangeability in, for example, the
relations between the inverse temperature (β), and the main effects (µ) and pairwise interactions
(Ω), or the relation between the cue and and alternative (ωca) and the base appeal of the alternative
(µa). Furthermore, as some readers may have noticed, while traditionally the Ising model σ takes
values in {−1, 1}, we use σ ∈ {0, 1} in the current paper. While there exists a linear transformation
of the parameters such that they are mathematically indistinguishable, and we would thus obtain
the same response probabilities, their interpretation in a choice context would be radically different.
We do therefore not propose that the choice structures we present in the next part are to be taken as
our theory of the particular decision. Rather, our goal is to demonstrate the utility of the proposed
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modelling framework, that derived from the Ising model, is capable of predicting both rational
decision-making behaviour, and deviations of this rationality.
* Similarity
The classic example for irrational choice behaviour known as the similarity effect, was given by
Debreu13, and goes as follows;
“Let the set U have the following three elements:
• DC , a recording of the Debussy quartet by the C quartet,
• BF , a recording of the eighth symphony of Beethoven by the B orchestra con-
ducted by F ,
• BK , a recording of the eighth symphony of Beethoven by the B orchestra con-
ducted by K,
The subject will be presented with a subset of U , will be asked to choose an element
in that subset, and will listen to the recording he has chosen. When presented with
{DC , BF} he chooses DC with probability
3/5. When presented with {BF , BK} he
chooses BF with probability
1/2. When presented with {DC , BK} he chooses DC
with probability 3/5. What happens if he is presented with {DC , BF , BK}? According
to rationality (original text: the axiom), he must chooseDC with probability
3/7. Thus
if he can choose between DC and BF , he would rather have Debussy. However if he
can choose between DC , BF , and BK , while being indifferent between BF and BK ,
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he would rather have Beethoven.”
It is immediately clear that the assumptions underlying rational decision-making, would for the this
scenario result in expected choice probabilities that are counter-intuitive. Specifically, in this case
one would expect that when presented with {DC , BF , BK}, DC would be chosen with probability
3/5, and the remaining
2/5 would be split evenly among BF and BK . An intuition that has since
been proven right in comparable experiments14, 17, 18.
One choice structure1 that explains the occurrence of the similarity effect, does this by introducing
a strong negative association between the two Beethoven recordings, as in shown in Figure 2. The
negative relation between BF and BK has no influence on choice probabilities for any of the pos-
sible two-element subsets, as such the slightly larger base appeal of DC will results in choosing
DC with probability
3/5, when presented with {DC , BF} or {DC , BK}. While still present when
presented with {BF , BK}, the negative relation works equally in both ways, such that one chooses
BF and BK both with probability
1/2. While the conditional distribution of the model from equa-
tion 2 predicts that DC will be chosen with probability
3/7, when a choice has to be made from all
three alternatives together, the rule that one stops as soon as the choice conditions hold for the first
time, will actually predict that when presented with {DC , BF , BK},DC is chosen with probability
3/5, whereas BF and BK are both chosen with probability
1/5. Hence, the explanation of ‘irra-
tional’ (yet intuitive) behaviour rest on the presence of a negative relation between the Beethoven
1The corresponding parameter values {µ,Ω, β, ε} are provided in the methods section, together with the com-
puter code that allows for the calculation of the expected response probabilities. However, as these examples are for
illustrative purposes, we will not discuss the exact values in the current example, nor the subsequent examples.
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recordings and the stopping rule.
R
BF BK DC
Figure 2: Choice graph for Debreu’s example of the similarity effect.
The vertex R represent the cue node ‘choose a Record’, the other vertices represent the choice alternatives ‘Beethoven
conducted by F ’ (BF ), the equally appealing ‘Beethoven conducted by K’ (BK), and the slightly more appealing
‘Debussy by the C quartet’ (DC). Whereas the negative relation between BF and BK has no influence on choice
probabilities for any of the possible two-element subsets, when a choice has to be made from all three alternatives
together, it will predict the occurrence of ‘irrational’ yet intuitively expected choice behaviour.
One could argue that the approach of reverse engineering a network structure until one obtains the
desired probabilities is a weakness of the framework. We do however believe that this is not a vice
but rather a virtue, as it allows the researcher to frame a single process into multiple theoretically
distinct structures. And while the expected probability distribution for each of these can be the
same, interventions or manipulations will naturally result in distinct predictions. For example,
if you were just presented with {DC , BF , BK} and chose Beethoven recordings by K. If you
are then given the opportunity to choose one other recording from the remaining set {DC , BF},
you would probably never choose BF in this case. This is also what would happen in the current
choice structure, as the model now takes the fact that you haveBK already into account (σBK = 1),
essentially turning it into an extra cue, such that the negative relation between the two Beethoven
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$ P+ P−
b R
$ P+ P−
Figure 3: Choice graph for Simonson & Tversky’s example of the attraction effect.
The vertex R represent the cue node ‘choose a Reward’, the other vertices represent the choice alternatives ‘money’
($), the slightly less appealing ‘nice pen’ (P+), and the much less appealing ‘pen’ (P−). a: the attraction affect
is explained by imposing negative relationships between the money and each of the pens. b: the attraction effect is
explained by imposing a positive relationship between the two pens.
recordings makes it unlikely that you will choose the remaining Beethoven recording.
* Attraction
Whereas the occurrence of the similarity effect has been explained by later models, for example,
Tversky’s elimination-by-aspects model18, the attraction effect poses a bigger challenge. We con-
sider a simple choice setup from Simonson & Tversky21, in which one group was offered a reward
(R) and had to choose between a nice pen (P+), which was chosen 36% of the time, or 6$ ($),
chosen 64% of the time. A second group was offered the same choice, now with a second, less
attractive, pen (P−), added to the choice alternatives. As expected the less attractive pen was only
chosen 2% of the time, however the proportion of people choosing the more attractive pen rose to
46%.
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A key assumption of rational choice is that of regularity, meaning that introducing a new option
cannot make the choice probabilities of the other alternatives increase. It is clear that assumption
this is violated in the current example, as adding a less appealing pen boosted the attraction of
the nice pen, thereby increasing its choice probability. Figure 3 shows two possible choice graphs
for this experiment, both these structures result in expected response frequencies similar to those
found in the experiment, however, each of these explain the occurrence of the attraction effect in
a different way. While in Figure 1a the explanation of the attraction effect rests on the presence
of a negative association between the money and both of the pens, in Figure 1b the effect is ex-
plained by a positive association between both of the pens. The framework presented in this paper
thus provides two ways in which the mere addition of a less appealing alternative, can boost the
selection of otherwise less frequently chosen alternatives.
As mentioned before, the fact that we can obtain the same results from different structures should
be seen as virtue of the model, as it allows us to compare the different theories that underlie each
of the different structures. For example, both choice graphs in Figure 3 predict that adding the less
attractive pen to the set of available alternatives boosts the selection probability of the nice pen
with respect to the money. Now, if we would ask someone, who just chose the nice pen, to make
a subsequent choice between the money and the less attractive pen, essentially everyone would
choose the money. This is however not the case for the one of the choice graphs in Figure 3. While
in the case of graph 3a the money would now be chosen more than 90% of the time, for graph
3b 33% of the people would still choose the less attractive pen. This illustrates that while both
of these graphs explain our current observations, the new predictions that they make are different,
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where one of the options is obviously much less plausible. The fact that the new framework allows
us to make these kinds of predictions, makes theories in this framework thus falsifiable.
* Compromise
The third violation, known as the compromise effect, can be demonstrated by another example
from Tversky and Simonson22. Here one group of subjects was offered a choice between a medium
quality camera, with a regular price (M), or a less expensive, but lower quality camera (L). The
second group was given the same choice with a high quality, but expensive, camera added to the
set of alternatives (H). In the first group the subjects chose both the low and medium quality/price
cameras with equal probability. In the second group the medium camera was still chosen approx-
imately half of the time, and the remainder split among the high and low quality/price cameras.
As the medium and low camera’s are equally appealing in the first group, and the low and high
quality camera are equally appealing in the second group, it is rational to judge the medium and
high camera also to be equally attractive. As this clearly is not the case, like the attraction effect,
adding a new alternative violates the regularity assumption.
A possible explanation for this finding might be that (dis)advantages of the medium camera with
respect to the high and low quality cameras are rather small, whereas the (dis)advantages between
the high and low quality camera are much larger. As such, adding the high quality/price camera
frames the medium quality/price camera as the compromise. As is shown in Figure 4, our expla-
nation of the compromise effect, once again, rests on the presence of a negative relation between
two alternatives.
14
CL M H
Figure 4: Choice graph for Tversky & Simonson’s example of the compromise effect.
The vertex C represent the cue node ‘buy a Camera’, the other vertices represent the camera alternatives with their
respected levels of quality and prize, ‘Low’ (L), ‘Medium’ (M), and ‘High’ (H). As the negative relation between
L and H is plays no role for the two-element subset {L,M} in group one, both L and M are chosen with equal
probability. However, the addition of H , that has a negative relation with L, frames M as the compromise, thereby
boosting the probability for it being chosen from the {L,M,H} set.
* Endowment
Besides implementing bounded rationality and explaining the occurrence of well known violations
of rationality, the model also gives a surprising explanation for the endowment effect7. The endow-
ment effect describes the tendency of people to value an object higher if they possess it compared
to when they do not.
To illustrate the endowment effect we consider a variation on the Debreu example, where all three
recordings are equally attractive. Suppose you are given one of the Beethoven recordings and
are presented with the option to exchange it for the Debussy recording. While someone else is
given the Debussy recording with the option to exchange it for the Beethoven recording. As both
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recordings are equally attractive, the choice axiom predict that you would exchange your current
Beethoven recording for the Debussy about half the time. The endowment effect says however that
people are unlikely to switch, a prediction that has been experimentally verified34.
Explanations offered for this effect are choice-supportive bias, the finding that people tend to at-
tribute more positive features to the object they chose compared to the object they did not choose35,
as this aligns their attitudes to be consistent with the choice and minimises cognitive dissonance. A
second mechanism could be the idea of loss aversion, the tendency that people value preventing the
loss of an object more than gaining an object of the same value36. In both cases this would translate
to an increase in base appeal of the alternative as soon as it would come into your possession. As
such, while two objects can be equally attractive before a choice is made, as soon as the choice is
made the chosen object will have an increase in base attractiveness compared to the non chosen
object.
With the current model we also obtain a new explanation, that does not depend on changes in the
values of the choice problem, but instead ties in to the choice process itself. If we frame the choice
as a choice between the Debussy of the Beethoven, having been given the Debussy makes that all
conditions of the choice problem are met. That is the choice process starts in a configuration which
is equivalent to one where a choice has already been made. As such there is no need to iterate at
all, which would explain why people tend to stay more often with their initial choice.
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Discussion
This article discusses the key phenomena discovered in discrete choice behaviour, and proposes
an elegant model, derived from the Ising model from statistical mechanics, with simple dynamics
to explain these. The proposed model explains a number of deviations from rationality, and ex-
hibits key theoretical principles from the field of decision making in a natural way, and allows the
construction of new choice situations that can predict new types of irrational behaviour.
It is remarkable that the theoretically distinct violations of rationality, that are well established
within the literature, can be explained by a simple mechanism in the choice model, namely the
introduction of a (negative) relation between alternatives and the rule to stop as soon as the choice
conditions hold for the first time. One might therefore argue that we are not dealing with three dif-
ferent effects that cause a violation of rationality, but just one mechanism that emerges in multiple
situations.
While we introduced the model here in all its simplicity, it is clear that many extensions and alter-
nations are possible. For example, it might be appropriate to introduce a non-symmetric relation
between two alternatives in some situations. Also, the decision process used in this paper was
chosen for illustrative purposes, naturally several other Markov processes of selecting, comparing,
and discarding choice alternatives are possible, all having the appropriate invariant distribution for
the choice probabilities. Depending on the particular choice, some processes may be more suitable
than others.
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Methods
Metropolis choice process For a choice with n alternatives, 2n different configurations for the
vector σ exist. We use σi to denote the i
th of the 2n possible states. Now, let P be a square matrix
of order 2n, where element Pij contains the probability of transitioning from σi to σj in one step of
the Metropolis algorithm. Pii contains the probability of staying in the current state, either because
the proposal state equals the current state, or the proposal state is rejected.
Pij = s(σj | σi)p(σi → σj) (4)
Pij = s(σi | σi) +
∑
j 6=i
s(σj | σi)(1− p(σi → σj)) (5)
From P we can obtain the expected rational response probabilities, contained in the stationary
distribution, by taking the values of the elements of the first eigenvector of P that correspond to
states in which the choice conditions are met (i.e., σc = 1 and σ+ = 2), and dividing these by their
sum. We will not go into this approach at length as these probabilities can much more simply be
obtained from equation 2.
To obtain the expected response probabilities, for when the response process stops as soon as the
choice conditions σc = 1 and σ+ = 2 are met for the first time, we reformulate the Markov chain
with transition matrix P as an absorbing chain with n absorbing states, i.e., those states where
only one alternative is active, and 2n − n transient states, i.e., those states where more than one
alternative or no alternatives are active. P has canonical form
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P =

Q R
0 I

 , (6)
where Q contains the transition probabilities from one transient state to another transient state, R
contains the transition probabilities from the transient states to absorbing states and I is an identity
matrix of order n representing that once an absorbing state is entered it cannot be left, and 0 is
the zero matrix, which represents the transition probabilities from an absorbing state to a transient
state (which are all zero). Rearranging P in its canonical form allows us to derive the expected
progression of the Markov chain more easily 37.
Let x ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} denote the alternative that is chosen. Furthermore, we use z = [z1, z2, . . . , z2n ]
to denote the resting state probabilities, where zi denotes the probability for the system to have
configuration σi for the alternatives in the resting state distribution. That is, z, contains the proba-
bilities of starting the choice process in some particular configuration (σ) of the alternatives. This
vector of probabilities z can be divided into the part containing the probabilities of starting in an
absorbing state(za), or transient states (zt). Finally, we let s denote the number of iterations of the
Metropolis algorithm.
We can now write the (marginal) probability that alternative x is chosen as
p(x) = za I+ zt
∞∑
s=0
QsRx , (7)
19
and using geometric series to rewrite the infinite sum overQs we can simplify this expression as
p(x) = za Ix + zt (I−Q)
−1Rx . (8)
As an added bonus we can derive the expected number of Metropolis iterations before alternative
x is chosen. While this is beyond the scope of the current paper, one can imagine using the number
of iterations as a proxy for the expected (qualitative ordering of) response times. Such predictions
can in turn be used to validate/compare different choice structures, or different response processes
for the same choice structure. The expected number of Metropolis iterations before particular
alternative is chosen is given by
E(s | x) =
1
p(x)
[
zt
∞∑
s=1
sQs−1Rx
]
. (9)
We can again use geometric series to rewrite the infinite sum over sQs−1 and simplify the expres-
sion as
E(s | x) =
1
p(x)
[
zt (I−Q)
−2Rx
]
. (10)
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Parameter values For each of the examples in Figures 2 to 4, we set β = 1, and ε = 0 to make
them easily comparable. Furthermore, in all examples the strength of the relationship between
the cue’s and the alternatives was set to one (ωca = 1). All base appeals, and relations between
alternatives were set to zero (µ = 0, ωaa = 0) unless otherwise specified. The parameters for
which non-default values were used are given in Table 1.
Data availability statement Data sharing not applicable to this article as no datasets were gener-
ated or analysed during the current study.
Code availability Software code used for calculating the expected choice probabilities and ex-
pected number of Metropolis iterations was written for the R programming environment38, and is
available from Github at https://github.com/JoostKruis/CIRM/. The code is dependent on the plyr
(https://cran.r-project.org/package=plyr), and qgraph (https://cran.r-project.org/package=qgraph)
packages. This repository also contains the setup to run this code for all examples discussed in
the paper.
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Table 1: Parameter values used in examples.
Figure: 2 3a 3b 4
µBF = 3 µ$ = 4.25 µ$ = 1.75 µCL = 7.5
µ µBK = 3 µP+ = 3.675 µP+ = 1.175 µCM = 7.5
µDC ≈ 3.405 µP− = 0.825 µP− = −1.675 µCH = 7.5
ω ωBF ,BK = −10 ω$,P+ = −0.59 ωP+,P− = 2.75 µCL,CH = −15
ω$,P
−
= −2.75
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